St. John's Law Review
Volume 85, Summer 2011, Number 3

Article 5

Abusive: Dodd-Frank Section 1031 and the Continuing Struggle To
Protect Consumers
Carey Alexander

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

ABUSIVE: DODD-FRANK SECTION 1031 AND
THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE TO
PROTECT CONSUMERS
CAREY ALEXANDERt
INTRODUCTION

On July 21, 2011, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
("Bureau" or "CFPB") stood up and gazed over a fragmented and
ineffective regulatory landscape.' Armed with the power to
stamp out abusive practices, the CFPB represents Congress's
latest and most potent stab in its century-long struggle to protect
consumers. 23 Originally proposed only in 2007,3 the Bureau was
ushered into the United States Code via Title X of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 4 ("DoddFrank") with remarkable speed in response to a remarkable
crisis.'

t Associate Managing Editor, St. John's Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2012, St.
John's University School of Law; B.A., 2004, Skidmore College. My endless thanks to
Professor Jeff Sovern for being the epitome of a great advisor: generous with his
ideas, accomodating with his time, and supportive throughout.
See Designated Transfer Date, 75 Fed. Reg. 57252 (Sept. 20, 2010).
2 See infra Part I.A-B.
3 See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY J., Summer 2007, at 8,
17.
4 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.
Code).
6 See S. REP. No. 111-176, at 2 (2010) (characterizing Dodd-Frank as "a direct
and comprehensive response to the financial crisis that nearly crippled the U.S.
economy
beginning
in 2008"); TIM
FERNHOLZ, NEW
AM. FOUND.,
THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU: TOOLS, TRANSITIONS, AND
CHOICES 8 (2010), available at http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/
files/policydocs/FernholzCFPB_10-2010_Final.pdf ("The CFPB represents a rarity
in recent U.S. political history: an entirely new bureaucracy, created swiftly in
response to a crisis . . .").

1105

1106

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:1105

Congress has long struggled to provide consumers with a
safe and reliable marketplace. In 1890, Congress passed the
landmark Sherman Antitrust Act.6 Although the Act professed
to attack some of the most egregiously monopolistic, and hence
anti-consumer practices, the Supreme Court in 1911 limited the
Act's reach to unreasonable restraints of trade.'
Congress
responded in 1914 by establishing the Federal Trade Commission
("Commission" or "FTC"), bestowing on it the mandate, if not the
power, to promulgate regulations protecting consumers.8 Yet
from its very first days, the FTC was barred from addressing the
types of financial practices that recently crippled the United
States economy. Section 5 of the 1914 FTC Act restricted the
FTC's power and jurisdiction from reaching banks,9 a prohibition
that would eventually expand to encompass savings and loan
institutions and federal credit unions.10
Although the
Commission's continued work on behalf of consumers is a
testament to its partial success, the Commission has fallen well
short of Congress's lofty goals." This failure is evidenced by calls
over the past three decades for a more powerful agency with the
sole mandate to protect consumers.12
The broader ineffectiveness of Congress's consumer safety
net is also revealed through harrowing statistics. In recent
years, America has become a land defined by its debilitating
addiction to consumer debt. In a country of 310 million, more
than 225 million Americans are over eighteen and empowered to
contract with banks.'3 197 million Americans enjoy access to

6 Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended
at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006)).
See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
8 See Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006)).
* See id.
10 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2006) ("The Commission is hereby empowered and
directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations, except banks, savings and

loan institutions . . . [and] Federal credit unions . . . from using unfair methods of

competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce.") (emphasis added).
11 See infra Part I.B.
12 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95-347, at 2-3 (1977) (recommending establishment of
an Agency for Consumer Protection).
1 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, S0101, AGE & SEX, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY
(2008); U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. & World Population Clocks, http://www.census.
gov/population/ww/poplockus.html (last revised Dec. 29, 2011).
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traditional bank accounts.1 4 Of those, 176 million hold a credit
card." These card-toting Americans do not hold just a single
card, but 3.5 credit cards on average." In total, Americans carry
The average
691 million credit cards, and they use them."
household charges $889 on each card every month, with nearly
$1.8 trillion flowing through our nation's credit cards every
year.1 8
What credit card companies might characterize as a welloiled, efficient credit market instead represents the problem
underlying consumer indebtedness and bankruptcy. While in
1975, Americans carried a revolving debt of $13 billion, by 2008,
Americans were hamstrung with a staggering $972 billion in
unpaid revolving consumer debt. 9 Nearly 90% of consumers who
file for bankruptcy carry a median credit card debt of $16,500.20
Credit card debt is second only to mortgage debt as a cause of
bankruptcy, and 52% of filers list it as a "major factor" in their
decision to file for bankruptcy.2 1
1 Twenty-eight million Americans are considered "unbanked." See Martin J.
Gruenberg, Vice Chairman, FDIC, Address at the Tennessee Bankers Association
(Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2006/
chairman/spdecl206.html.
15 See KEVIN FOSTER ET AL., FED. RES. BANK OF BOSTON, THE 2008 SURVEY OF
CONSUMER PAYMENT CHOICE 56 (2008) [hereinafter CONSUMER PAYMENT CHOICE
SURVEY] ("[T]o estimate the total number of credit card users in the U.S. from the
percentage of U.S. consumers who had a credit card in 2008, one would take the
percentage of U.S. consumers who had adopted credit cards .. . (78.3 percent), divide
by 100, and multiply by the population in 2008 (225,852,350) to get 176.8 million
consumers.").
16 See id. at
9.
" See U.S. GOV'T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-929, CREDIT CARDS:
INCREASED COMPLEXITY IN RATES AND FEES HEIGHTENS NEED FOR MORE
EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURES TO CONSUMERS 9 (2006) [hereinafter GAO CREDIT CARD
REPORT].
1 See CONSUMER PAYMENT CHOICE SURVEY, supra note 15, at 7.
" See FED. RES., G.19, FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE: CONSUMER
CREDIT (2011), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/gl9/hist/ce
histsa.html (as of December 2011, outstanding revolving debt fell to approximately
$800 billion); see also Consumer Debt: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Commercial
and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,111th Cong. 14-15 (2009)
[hereinafter Consumer Debt Hearings] (statement of Adam J. Levitin, Associate
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center) ("[M]acroeconomic pressures
on the American family are the primary driver of card debt. Card debt is the Scotch
tape holding together the middle class.").
20 See Consumer Debt Hearings, supra note 19, at 12 (statement of Adam J.
Levitin, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center) (citing the
2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project).
21 See id. at 12, 14.
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Responding to the Great Recession's devastating effects on
the housing market and broader economy, the President and
Congress joined to create the CFPB, bestowing on it both the
What
mandate and the power to curb abusive practices.
Congress's desire to protect consumers lacked in novelty was
more than made up for by the unique and necessary powers
granted to the Bureau to secure the dangerous wilderness of the
consumer credit market. The crux of Congress's power grant lies
in Section 1031:
The Bureau may take any action authorized ... to prevent a
covered person or service provider from committing or engaging
in an unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice under Federal
law in connection with any transaction with a consumer for a
consumer financial product or service, or the offering of a
consumer financial product or service.2 2
This Note first contextualizes the need for Section 1031 by
examining the roots and shortcomings of existing consumer
protection law embodied in unfairness, deception, and
unconscionability doctrines. Part II chronicles the enactment of
Section 1031, paying close attention to the Administration's
proposed definitions for unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices,
and Congress's replies. Part III applies the enacted definition of
"abusive" to several widespread practices in the consumer credit
market, and urges the CFPB to adopt a broad interpretation of
the term as consistent with Congress's longstanding intent to
protect consumers.
THE FRAGMENTED STATE OF CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW

I.

Congress has long worked to achieve a consistent goal:
protect consumers from harm. While on one end of the spectrum,
independent agencies like the Consumer Product Safety
Commission and the Food and Drug Administration exist to
protect consumers from products that could compromise their
physical safety, most consumer protection legislation-including
the legislative portfolio the CFPB is meant to enforce 23 -protects
consumers from dangerous practices that could compromise their

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1031(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2005 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (Supp. IV
2011)).
23 See id. § 1002(12), 124 Stat. at 1957 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5481(12)).
22
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financial safety.24 Statutes banning unfair and deceptive acts
and practices ("UDAP") provide the overarching framework for
modern consumer protection actions. Unfairness and deception
have well-established meanings, and their inclusion alongside
"abusive" suggests that the new doctrine represents something
different from but as substantial as the old doctrines. To better
contextualize the potential reach of "abusive" as used in Section
1031, it is necessary to first consider the development and reach
of the existing doctrines.
A.

Unfairness
Congress's initial attempt to enact overarching consumer
protection legislation came in the form of unfairness doctrine,
which the new Federal Trade Commission was meant to
implement. Established in 1914, the FTC was fashioned as "an
instrumentality for doing justice to business where the processes
of the courts or the natural forces of correction outside the courts
are inadequate to adjust the remedy to the wrong in a way that
will meet all the equities and circumstances of the case."25
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act powerfully
proclaimed: "unfair competition in commerce is hereby declared
unlawful,"2 6' and the nascent FTC was directed to "prevent
corporations from using unfair methods of competition in
commerce."27
What constituted unfair practices remained
intentionally undefined, a decision the Senate Committee on
Interstate Commerce felt necessary to explain:
The Committee gave careful consideration to the question as to
whether it would attempt to define the many and variable
unfair practices which prevail in commerce and to forbid their
See id.; see also Warren, supra note 3, at 8-9.
S. REP. No. 597, at 7 (1914). Not all Members of Congress were enthusiastic
about the Commission's creation. For example, Senator Brandegee characterized the
Commission's effect on the country as "nothing but a scourge and a dose of Spanish
fly and cayenne pepper." 51 CONG. REC. 12,218 (1914) (statement of Sen.
Brandegee). He colorfully added, with a twinge of fear regarding the nascent
Commission's potential reach: "[N]o benevolent despots are to be allowed to roam
about with an eclectic commission to fix things so that they will run smoothly
according to their notions of what may be 'ethical' or not 'anti-social' or for the 'public
interest,' or any of those 'goo-goo' phrases." Id. at 12,734.
26 S. REP. No. 597, at 3 (1914).
21 Id. at 3. Section 5 declared in full: "That unfair competition in commerce is
hereby declared unlawful. The commission is hereby empowered and directed to
prevent corporations from using unfair methods of competition in commerce." Id.
24
25
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continuance or whether it would, by a general declaration
condemning unfair practices, leave it to the commission to
determine what practices were unfair. It concluded that the
latter course would be the better .... 28
Similarly, the House Conference Report lamented:
It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair
practices. There is no limit to human inventiveness in this
field. Even if all known unfair practices were specifically
defined and prohibited, it would be at once necessary to begin
over again. If Congress were to adopt the method of definition,
it would undertake an endless task.29
Unfairness doctrine never lived up to its full potential3 0 and
lay fallow for nearly fifty years as an independent basis in which
to ground consumer protection measures. It was not until 1964,
in articulating what came to be known as the Cigarette Rule,
that the FTC tried to declare a practice as unfair without
invoking other consumer protection doctrines.3 1 Prefacing the
"No
1964 rule, the Commission echoed Congress, warning:
enumeration of examples can define the outer limits of the
or
acts
unfair
to
proscribe
authority
Commission's
practices .... "32 In declaring a practice unfair, the Commission
announced that it would consider: (1) whether the practice
offended public policy established by statute or the common law;
or
(2) whether it was immoral, unethical, oppressive,
unscrupulous; and (3) whether it caused substantial injury to
consumers.33 The Supreme Court endorsed the definition in the
landmark 1972 case FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,"
confirming that unfairness was an independent basis in which to
ground consumer protection measures.
Congress, however, curtailed the doctrine's reach after the
FTC-secure in its new interpretation of its old power-tested
the doctrine's potential by attempting to restrict advertising

28

S. REP. No. 597, at 13 (1914).

H.R. REP. No. 1142, at 19 (1914).
so See infra Part I.B; FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244-45
(1972) (declaring unfairness doctrine to be broader than deception doctrine).
,1 See Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of "UnfairActs or Practices"in Section 5 of
the Federal Trade CommissionAct, 70 GEO. L.J. 225, 239-41 (1981).
2 Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the
Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (July 2, 1964).
31 See id.
3 405 U.S. at 244.
29
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targeting children as unfair on public policy grounds.15 So
incensed was Congress over the proposal that it temporarily
revoked the Commission's power to declare advertising as
unfair.
The FTC tweaked its interpretation of unfairness doctrine in
1980, promulgating a definition that placated Congress and
which mostly survives to this day." In deciding whether to
declare a practice unfair, the Commission claimed that it would
consider whether a consumer injury was: (1) substantial,
(2) outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or
competition, and (3) something that consumers themselves could
The definition is significant for two
not reasonably avoid.
reasons. First, it restricts the Commission from acting without
weighing a practice's net societal benefits against the benefit of
any consumer protection.3 9 Second, in explaining the definition,
the Commission suggested that violations of established public
policy by themselves might support a finding of unfairness.4 0

* See Children's Advertising, 43 Fed. Reg. 17967, 17968-69 (Apr. 27, 1978); Am.
Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Roscoe B. Starek, III,
Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, The ABCs at the FTC: Marketing and Advertising to
Children, Address at the Minnesota Institute of Legal Education (July 25, 1997),
availableat http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/starek/minnfin.shtm.
36 See Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96252, 94 Stat. 374 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 58 (2006)).
1
Although the current definition is different from the old Sperry & Hutchinson
rule, both definitions arguably reach the same universe of practices. See CAROLYN
CARTER ET AL., UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES § 4.3.3.3.2, at 255 (7th
ed. 2008) ("To some extent, distinctions between the 'S&H' standard and the current
FTC definition of unfairness may have little practical effect.").
1
Letter from Michael Pertschuk et al., Chairman & Comm'rs, Fed. Trade
Comm'n, to Wendell H. Ford, Chairman, Consumer Subcomm. & John C. Danforth,
Ranking Minority Member, Consumer Subcomm., FTC Policy Statement on
Unfairness (Dec. 17. 1980) [hereinafter FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness],
availableat http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm.
" See id. ("To justify a finding of unfairness the injury must satisfy three tests.
It must be substantial; it must not be outweighed by any countervailing benefits to
consumers or competition that the practice produces; and it must be an injury that
consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided.").
40 See id. ("Sometimes public policy will independently support a Commission
action. This occurs when the policy is so clear that it will entirely determine the
question of consumer injury, so there is little need for separate analysis by the
Commission. In these cases the legislature or court, in announcing the policy, has
already determined that such injury does exist and thus it need not be expressly
proved in each instance.").
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Congress eventually codified the FTC's interpretation of
unfairness doctrine 4 1 but not before restricting the Commission's
ability to consider public policy. The Senate's initial codification
attempt would have adopted the Commission's definition,
allowing it to weigh the net societal benefits of an unfair practice
while remaining silent with regards to the effect of public
policy. 42 The House, however, insisted that the codified version
limit the Commission from making a finding of unfairness solely
on public policy grounds. 43 The version Congress ultimately
accepted included the net societal benefits standard and
cemented the House's limit on the role of public policy. 4 4 A
similar debate would again arise during Section 1031's drafting.4 5
B.

Deception

Although Congress meant for unfairness doctrine to cover
practices that affected both consumers and businesses," the
Supreme Court in the 1931 case FTC v. Raladam Co. 47
constrained unfairness doctrine to reach only practices that

41 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006) ("The Commission shall have no authority under
this section or section 57a of this title to declare unlawful an act or practice on the
grounds that such act or practice is unfair unless the act or practice causes or is
likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers
or to competition. In determining whether an act or practice is unfair, the
Commission may consider established public policies as evidence to be considered
with all other evidence. Such public policy considerations may not serve as a
primary basis for such determination.").
42 See Federal Trade Commission Act Amentments of 1993, H.R. 2243, 103rd
Cong. § 10 (as passed by Senate, Sept. 22, 1993) ("The Commission shall have no
authority under this section or section 18 to declare unlawful an act or practice on
the grounds that such act or practice is unfair unless the act or practice causes or is
likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers
or to competition.").
' See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n); H.R. REP. NO. 103-617, at 12 (1994) (Conf. Rep.); see
also 140 CONG. REC. H 6162 (1994) (statement of Rep. Moorhead) ("Taken as a
whole, these new criteria defining the unfairness standard should provide a strong
bulwark against potential abuses of the unfairness standard by an overzealous
FTC-a phenomenon we last observed in the late 1970's.").
" See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
4 See infra Part II.A.
46 See H.R. REP. No. 1613, at 3 (1937).

4

283 U.S. 643 (1931).
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affected businesses.4 8 In doing so, the Court created the need for
a new doctrine to protect consumers. Congress responded with
the 1938 Wheeler-Lea Act, establishing deception doctrine. 9
The House clearly identified the evil that deception doctrine
was meant to address, saying: "[We cannot ignore the evils and
abuses of advertising; the imposition upon the unsuspecting; and
the downright criminality of preying upon the sick as well as the
consuming public through fraudulent, false, or subtle misleading
advertisements."5 0
Congress provided only a threadbare
definition of "deceptive," stating that the term covered acts that
were "misleading in a material respect."5 1
Defending the
expansiveness of the statute, the House report explained:
The definition is broad enough to cover every form of
advertisement deception over which it would be humanly
practicable to exercise governmental control. It covers every

case of imposition on a purchaser for which there could be a
practical remedy. It reaches every case from that of inadvertent
or uninformed advertising to that of the most subtle as well as
the most vicious types of advertisement.52
Congress meant for deception doctrine to be the last word
needed to protect consumers from false advertising.5 3 Indeed,
deception doctrine frames the basis for most consumer protection
regimes around the world.54

48 See id. at 647-48 ("The paramount aim of the act is the protection of the
public from the evils likely to result from the destruction of competition or the
restriction of it in a substantial degree, and this presupposes the existence of some
substantial competition to be affected, since the public is not concerned in the
maintenance of competition which itself is without real substance."); see also H.R.
REP. NO. 1613, at 3 (1937) ("Thus, if a person, partnership, or corporation has a
monopoly in a certain field, so that there is no competitor, his acts, no matter how
deceptive or misleading and unfair to the consuming public, may not be
restrained.").
" Wheeler Lea Act, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006)).
50 H.R. REP. No. 1613, at 4 (1937).
Id. at 5.
52 Id. (emphasis added).
" See id.
6 See, e.g., Council Directive 2005/29, 2005 O.J. (L 149) 22, 27 (EC); Section 13
of the Fair Trading Act 1986 (N.Z.); Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 53 (Austl.);
Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. 34 § 74.01 (Can.).
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Congress itself offered praise to the agency charged with
realizing the doctrine's theoretical reach:
The Federal Trade Commission has the machinery and trained
personnel to investigate in a proceeding against false
advertising of all industries and all commodities. The common
motive of false advertisement is the same in every line of
industry, to gain an economic advantage through defrauding or
misleading the purchaser. This method of protecting the public
should be harmonized and unified under one organization with
consistent and uniform methods of enforcement and
penalization. Efficiency, uniformity, and economy suggest this
course. This legislation is framed with that purpose in mind."
In the years since, the FTC itself has offered narrower
boundaries that have limited deception doctrine's reach.
According to the Commission, deceptive practices have three
elements: (1) a material (2) representation or omission that is
(3) likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably under the
circumstances. 6 The state of consumer protection today and the
need for the CFPB suggest that deception doctrine, like
unfairness doctrine, has fallen short of Congress's lofty goals.
State and Common Law Remedies
While it took Congress until the early twentieth century to
enter the consumer protection sphere, courts of equity have
summoned the common law doctrine of unconscionability
for more than two centuries to shield consumers from
In 1750, Lord Hardwicke described
onerous contracts. 7
unconscionable contracts as those "such as no man in his senses
and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no
C.

H.R. REP. No. 1613, at 5 (1937).
" Letter from James C. Miller Michael, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, to John
D. Dingell, Chairman, Comm. on Energy & Commerce, FTC Policy Statement on
Deception (Oct. 14. 1983), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/addecept.htm.
" See Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1948) ("That equity
does not enforce unconscionable bargains is too well established to require elaborate
citation."). Just as legislative action reflected judicial practice, judicial practice
reflected deep-seated cultural norms. The Bible itself warns: "You shall not . .. put a
stumbling block in front of the blind." Leviticus 19:14 (New International). Some
have interpreted this to require protection for consumers who are ignorant about the
items they purchase. See JEFF SOVERN, CONSUMER PROTECTION APPENDIX 1.1 (22d
ed. 2010).
56
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honest and fair man would accept on the other."" Born into
modern jurisprudence by the Uniform Commercial Code,"
unconscionability is an occasionally but unreliably powerful
doctrine. One court rightly complained: "[Unconscionability has
proved difficult to define and has been rarely invoked
undoubtedly because, other than in exceptional cases, it has been
largely viewed as grossly interfering with the freedom to
contract." 0 Yet, at its most powerful, unconscionability doctrine
has been used to strike down some of the very practices that led
to the country's current economic woes. 6 '
Although useful as a shield, unconscionability doctrine
serves as a poor sword to wield against abusive practices. First,
it can only be used as a defense to onerous contracts. Second,
unconscionability claims are notoriously difficult to win.62 While
courts frown on "bargaining naughtiness" 63 in the form of
" Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889) (quoting Earl of Chesterfield
v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sen. 125, 155, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750)).
" See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2003) ("If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or
any term of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made, the
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable term, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.").
o Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 800 A.2d 915, 916 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
2002).
61 See, e.g., Besta v. Beneficial Loan Co. of Iowa, 855 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1988).
There, the Eighth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals struck down a
mortgage with a six-year term as unconscionable because the loan company failed to
inform the consumer that she was eligible to receive a three-year term with a lower
payment. See id. at 535 ("[N]o person in her senses would have accepted the more
expensive term. This constituted, at least, procedural unconscionability."). Were
such a ruling promulgated not by a court as a shield against a single mortgage, but
as a sword against a set of practices wielded by a regulatory agency, it would have
struck at one of the central pillars of the mortgage crisis. See CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT PANEL, FORECLOSURE CRISIS: WORKING TOWARD A SOLUTION 15 (2009)
[hereinafter FORECLOSURE CRISIS] ("The underlying problem in the foreclosure crisis
is that many Americans have unaffordable mortgages. ... [Blorrowers who qualified
for lower cost mortgages were steered into higher priced subprime mortgage
products.").
Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of
62 See
Unconscionability:An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067,
1097-99 (2006) ("Data revealed that in only 37.8% (56 out of 148) of the cases
sampled unconscionability was found. . . .").
" See id. at 1073; Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The
Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 504 (1967). More broadly, procedural
unconscionability examines the sophistication of the contracting parties, whether
both were represented by counsel, and whether the questionable clause was obscure
or buried in fine print. See DiMatteo, supra note 62, at 1077 (quoting Nasco, Inc. v.
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procedural unconscionability, they seldom strike down a contract
without also finding substantive unconscionability, which
evaluates the contract's fairness.64
Unconscionability doctrine, however, is extremely useful to
the extent that it dialogues with state UDAP statutes.
prohibit
expressly
statutes
UDAP
state
Seventeen
5
unconscionable practices, yet only a handful of statutes adopt
both an unconscionability provision and a bar against
unfairness. 6 Two states, Massachusetts and Missouri, go so far
as to statutorily equate unconscionability to unfairness. 7
Clearly, UDAP statutes and other consumer protection measures
are meant to codify unconscionability doctrine's soul, and the
equitable principles underlying the latter should be considered a
useful guide when attempting to interpret the former. 8
II.

ENACTING UNFAIRNESS, DECEPTION, AND ABUSIVE
DOCTRINES IN DODD-FRANK

Dodd-Frank fundamentally reworked consumer protection
law, altering not only the accepted definitions of unfairness and
deception, but adding a potent new tool in the form of abusive
doctrine. This Part will chronicle the Obama Administration's
proposed changes to the existing consumer protection doctrines
along with Congress's skeptical but ultimately accommodating
response. Section A will trace the evolution of the existing
consumer protection doctrines under Dodd-Frank, showing how
Congress subtly changed their meanings as applied to the CFPB.
Section B will consider the origin and development of "abusive"
as a term in Dodd-Frank, highlighting in particular the adoption
Pub. Storage, Inc., No. 92-12731-RCL, 1995 WL 337072, at *5 (D. Mass. May 11,
1995)).
* See DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 62, at 1098 ("[W]here substantive
unconscionability is found without a finding of procedural unconscionability the
contract is ultimately found to be unconscionable 100% (15 out of 15) of the time.
Only in one instance did the court rule that a contract was unconscionable after
finding only procedural unconscionability present."). Substantive unconscionability
looks for significant cost-price disparities, clauses that deny basic rights and
remedies, penalty clauses, and overall imbalances in the bargaining process. See id.
at 1079.
65 See CARTER, supra note 37, § 4.4.1, at 266.
6 See id.
67 See 940 MAss. CODE REGS. 3.16 (2011); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 15, § 608.080 (1994).
6 See CARTER, supra note 37, § 4.3.12, at 265.
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of a powerful and flexible definition over a weak and hobbled
alternative.
Finally, against this backdrop, Section C will
contextualize the use of "abusive" in Dodd-Frank and distinguish
it from the term's use in other statutes, demonstrating that it
represents a substantial and unique grant of power that the
CFPB can draw upon to protect consumers.
The Evolving Consumer ProtectionLandscape Under DoddFrank
To appreciate the full reach of the CFPB's power to prohibit
abusive practices, one must first acknowledge that Congress
quietly overhauled the consumer protection landscape by altering
The
the accepted definitions of unfairness and deception.
Administration's initial proposal for the CFPB arrived on the Hill
in the form of a ninety-page document simply called the
President's White Paper, which later became H.R. 3126 ("White
Paper").6 ' The White Paper's proposed changes to the existing
doctrines were mostly rejected in the House-passed H.R. 4173,70
which attempted to codify existing law. The Senate's parry,'
adopted as the conference report and later codified,7 2 refused to
accept, references to existing law, providing evidence that the
CFPB may have different powers under Dodd-Frank than the
FTC under the FTC Act to curb unfair and deceptive practices.
Unfairness doctrine experienced the most tumultuous
journey through the legislative process. Rekindling Congress's
earlier debates, all three versions of Dodd-Frank weighed the
importance of public policy differently as it related to a finding of
A.

H.R. 3126, 111th Cong. (2009).
H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (as passed by House, Dec. 11, 2009).
71 S. REP. No. 111-176 (2010).
72 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
69

7o
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unfairness. While retaining the net societal benefits standard, 3
the White Paper placed public policy on a seemingly equal footing
with other considerations:
ESTABLISHED
PUBLIC
POLICY
AS
FACTOR.-In
determining whether an act or practice is unfair, the Agency
may consider established public policies as evidence to be
considered with all other evidence. 74
The House-passed version, however, rejected the White
Paper proposal. Instead, the House chose to reference existing
law, which would have bound the CFPB to the FTC's restrictive
interpretation of unfairness:
UNFAIR ACTS OR PRACTICES.-Any determination by the
Director and the Agency that an act or practice is unfair shall
be consistent with the standard set forth under section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act and with the policy statement
adopted by the Federal Trade Commission pursuant to section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act and dated December 17,
1980."
Rather than codify the current conception of unfairness
doctrine, the Senate chose to adopt most of the base language
provided by the White Paper, but only after adding one key
caveat:
CONSIDERATION OF PUBLIC POLICIES.-In determining
whether an act or practice is unfair, the Bureau may consider
established public policies as evidence to be considered with all
other evidence. Such public policy considerations may not serve
as a primary basis for such determination.7 6

7 See supra Part LA; see also Vincent DiLorenzo,
The Federal Financial
Consumer Protection Agency: A New Era of Protection or More of the Same? 81-83
(St. John's Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 100182, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1674016. Some commentators
argue that the net societal benefits requirement provides flexibility. Unlike
deception doctrine, which requires a per se analysis of whether conduct is deceptive
or not, unfairness doctrine allows the FTC to condemn, for example, the use and
implementation of a technology, rather than the technology itself. See Dara J.

Diomande, The Re-Emergence of the Unfairness Doctrine in Federal Trade
Commission and State Consumer Protection Cases, 18 ANTITRUST 53, 54-55 (2004).
7 H.R. 3126, 111th Cong. § 131(c)(2) (2009).
7 H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 4301(c)(1) (as passed by House, Dec. 11, 2009); see
also supra Part I.A.
76 § 1031(c)(2), 124 Stat. at 2006 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)(2) (Supp. IV
2011)) (emphasis added).
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The definition of deception underwent a similar, if less
substantial, set of legislative changes. The White Paper declined
to define deception, instead giving the CFPB the power to take
"4any action authorized . . . to prevent a person from committing

or engaging in an unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice.""
As with unfairness doctrine, the House attempted to codify the
existing definition of deception articulated by the FTC:
DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES.-Any determination by
the Director and the Agency that an act or practice is deceptive
shall be consistent with the policy statement adopted by the
Federal Trade Commission pursuant to section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act and dated October 14, 1983.
The Senate again asserted itself and adopted the White
Paper language without modification, leaving deception
undefined in Dodd-Frank.
Supreme Court jurisprudence conspires with the canons of
interpretation to underscore the importance of these changes. It
is "of paramount importance," the Court has declared, "that
Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear
interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the language
it adopts."" Whenever Congress adopts language with a "known
and settled construction," it is presumed to adopt the previous
judicial interpretations surrounding that language.8 '
Had Congress codified the House language expressly
adopting the FTC's policy statements, the CFPB's powers to
prohibit unfair and deceptive acts would be known and settled:
they would be the same as the FTC's under the FTC Act.
Instead, because Congress effectively rejected the FTC's
definitions, the CFPB may have a freer hand to define its ability
to reach unfair and deceptive practices under Dodd-Frank."
While a complete discussion of the implication of these changes
H.R. 3126, § 131(a).
H.R. 4173, § 4301(c)(2).
79 See § 1031(a), 124 Stat. at 2005 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a)).
so Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989).
e' Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 36 (1899); see also Carolene Prods. Co.
v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 26 (1944); Karl N. Llewelyn, Remarks on the Theory
of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be
Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 402 (1950) ("Where a foreign statute which has
received construction has been adopted, previous construction is adopted too.").
82 But see Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40, 61 (1947) ("The interpretation
of statutes cannot safely be made to rest upon mute intermediate legislative
maneuvers.").
77
78
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and the CFPB's powers to address unfair and deceptive practices
is beyond the scope of this Note, the implications of these altered
definitions will be briefly touched upon below.8 3

B.

The Evolving Definition of "Abusive"

In fashioning the newest arrow in the consumer protection
quiver, the Administration understandably wanted to provide the
room for regulatory
nascent
CFPB with substantial
interpretation. 84 As a term, "abusive" was delivered via the
White Paper without a definition." Just as the White Paper saw
fit to the let CFPB itself define deception, the Obama
Administration was willing to let the CFPB determine the
constellation of factors that would mark the bounds of abusive
doctrine.
Both chambers of Congress objected to such an unbridled
grant of power and asserted themselves with competing
definitions. The definition of "abusive," however, never became
the subject of Congressional debate, and any committee-level
maneuvering over the definition failed to percolate into the
public record. Consequently, the full meaning of each chambers'
replies must be inferred solely from the language of the bills they
passed.
The House would have established a high bar, permitting the
CFPB to declare a practice abusive only after meeting two
conditions:
The Director and the Agency may determine that an act or
practice is abusive only if the Director finds that(A) the act or practice is reasonably likely to result in a
consumer's inability to understand the terms and conditions
of a financial product or service i to protect their own
interests in selecting or using a financial product or service;
and
(B) the widespread use of the act or practice is reasonably
likely to contribute to instability and greater risk in the
financial system.86
See infra Part III.C.
* The words and phrases delineating a statute's outer boundaries are utterly
critical. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domain, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 537
(1983) ("[M]embers of Congress know that zipper clauses in statutes just invite
clever evasions.").
5 See H.R. 3126, 111th Cong. § 131 (2009).
* H.R. 4173, § 4301(c)(3) (emphasis added).
83
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The definition has several noteworthy features. While the
phrase "reasonably likely"-the Congressional drafter's go-to
ambiguous phrase-would appear to give the CFPB a broad
reach, that reach is substantially curtailed by subsection B's
requirement that the practice in question contribute to both risk
and instability in the financial system. Further, the definition
adopts an arguably harsher version of the net societal benefits
standard by requiring the CFPB to not only consider the systemic
impact of a practice, but to also find such systemic harm
reasonably likely.
The Senate balked at the House's language and replied with
a definition that provides a broader and firmer base of support
from which the CFPB can address abusive practices. The Senate
definition was accepted into the conference report and codified as
follows:
(d) Abusive.-The Bureau shall have no authority under this
section to declare an act or practice abusive in connection with
the provision of a consumer financial product or service, unless
the act or practice(1) materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to
understand a term or condition of a consumer financial
product or service; or
(2) takes unreasonable advantage of(A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer
of the material risks, costs, or conditions of the product
or service;
(B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests
of the consumer in selecting or using a consumer
financial product or service; or
(C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a
covered person to act in the interests of the consumer.8 7
Both the language and the substantive reach of the codified
version are substantially more expansive than the House's
proposal. The Senate jettisoned the House's "reasonably likely"
language, which, with its emphasis on foreseeability, sounds
almost in tort, in favor of the near-contractual concepts of

"8Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1031(d), 124 Stat. 1376, 2006 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d) (Supp. IV
2011)) (emphasis added).
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interference and advantage. 8 Gone was the House's two-step
barrier to action and its embrace of the net societal benefits
standard, replaced instead by four independent criteria under
which the CFPB could act.
The Senate accepted two of the grounds identified by the
First, in Section
House for declaring a practice abusive.
1031(d)(1), the Senate, like the House, targeted practices that
materially interfere with a consumer's ability to understand a
product or service's terms or conditions. Among other things,
this prong seems to acknowledge that some disclosures by
themselves, regardless of how they are drafted, may be
insufficient to protect consumers grappling with complex
financial devices. Second, in Section 1031(d)(2)(B) both the
House and Senate, reflecting many of the equitable principles
undergirding unconscionability doctrine, offered express
protections to consumers who are unable to protect their own
interests.
The Senate's definition provides two additional independent
The language
grounds for declaring a practice abusive.
in Section 1031(d)(2)(A) encompassing practices that take
unreasonable advantage of a consumer's lack of understanding
echoes and amplifies the language prohibiting practices that
materially interfere with a consumer's ability to understand a
term or condition.8 9 The language in Section 1031(d)(2)(C) also
adds a seemingly expansive provision that protects a consumer's
reasonable reliance on financial agents to act in the consumer's
best interest, which would address many of the causes of the
Taken together, these codified
current foreclosure crisis.90
provisions give the CFPB vastly more power and flexibility than
the Bureau would have received under the House's language.

* See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. Compare RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (2010), with
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (1981).
89 These first three prongs appear to target much of the pre-contractual
bargaining naughtiness that procedural unconscionability is meant to remedy. See
supra note 63 and accompanying text.
90See, e.g., supra note 61.
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C.

Distinguishing"Abusive" in Dodd-Frankfrom "Abusive" in
Other Statutes
Although as a term, "abusive" has appeared primarily in
debt collection statutes, such statutes are an improper lens
through which to view the reach of "abusive" as used in Section
1031. On the federal level, the term appears prominently in the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act's ("FDCPA") findings.9 1
Likewise, the term has filtered down into state statutes targeting
debt collection practices.92
Debt collection, by its nature, is a field lending itself to what
would be conversationally termed "abusive practices." As a
result, legislatures impose a form of absolute liability on debt
collectors, delineating narrow bands of permitted activity and
declaring acts falling outside those bounds to be abusive. 93
Construing Section 1031's use of "abusive" to confer any
conception of absolute liability would, however, drastically limit
both the power and reach of the CFPB to only the most heinous
offenses.
Debt collection statutes, however, are readily distinguishable
from Dodd-Frank because they include a private right of action
allowing individuals to file civil suits against debt collectors
alleging violation of the FDCPA.9 ' Because the threat of civil
litigation, backed by absolute liability, looms over debt collectors,
there is a strong incentive for collectors to conform their behavior
91 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2006) ("It is the purpose of this [title] to eliminate
abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt
collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not
competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect
consumers against debt collection abuses.").
92 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-646 (West 2011) ("No creditor shall use any
abusive, harassing, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading representation, device or
practice to collect or attempt to collect any debt."); D.C. CODE § 28-3814(c)(4) (2001);
HIAw. REV. STAT. § 480D-1 (2011) ("ensur[ing] that consumers are not subjected to
unfair, deceptive, coercive, abusive, or harassing conduct in collection activities");
IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.7103(1)(d) (West 2011) (making it illegal to "subject the
debtor to harsh, vindictive or abusive collection attempts"); MICH. CONIP. LAWS ANN.
§ 445.252(n) (West 2011) (regulated persons shall not use "a harassing, oppressive,
or abusive method to collect a debt").
" See Elwin Griffith, The Search for More Fairness in the FairDebt Collection
PracticesAct, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 561 (2003).
" See 15. U.S.C. § 1692k (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). State statutes occasionally
provide similar civil remedies. See, e.g., TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 392.403(a) (West
2011) (permitting both civil recovery of actual damages and injunctive relief to
prevent continuing violations).
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as closely as possible to the letter of the law."5 This is by design.
Congress meant to augment the FTC's own enforcement
authority with the threat of civil action."
The CFPB, by contrast, does not need to set the bar for
abusive conduct nearly as high as the FDCPA because DoddFrank does not authorize a private right of action." As a result,
it is reasonable for Congress to have greater faith in the Bureau
to responsibly regulate abusive conduct that might fall short of
the absolute liability regime established by the FDCPA.9"
As a term, "abusive" has also been subject to agency
interpretation. In 1994, Congress passed the Home Ownership
and Equity Protection Act ("HOEPA"), conferring on the Federal
Reserve Board ("Fed") the power to prohibit abusive practices
associated with mortgage loan refinancing.99 While the Fed
largely ignored this grant of authority, it finally found it
expedient to call upon its dormant powers in 2008 at the peak of
" Congress's deployment of "abusive" in service of an absolute liability regime is
further echoed in the Telemarketing Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act
("TCFAPA"). See 15. U.S.C. § 6102(a)(1) (2006) ("The Commission shall prescribe
rules prohibiting deceptive telemarketing acts or practices and other abusive
telemarketing acts or practices."). As with the FDCPA, TCFAPA provides consumers
with a private right of action. See 15 U.S.C. § 6101 ("The Congress makes the
following findings.. . . Interstate telemarketing fraud has become a problem of such
magnitude that the resources of the Federal Trade Commission are not sufficient to
ensure adequate consumer protection from such fraud. . . . Consequently, Congress
should enact legislation that will offer consumers necessary protection from
telemarketing deception and abuse."); 15 U.S.C. § 6104.
96 See S. REP. No. 95-382, at 5 (1977).
1 One scholar, however, has suggested that Congress may want to establish an
absolute liability regime for consumer credit cards:
The better regulatory structure would be to prohibit anything, except for
specific permitted practices. Such a regulatory model could be combined
with a mandatory simplification of credit card price structures. All of credit
cards' myriad price points can be boiled down into three price terms: an
availability fee, a transaction fee, and an interest rate. Congress would do
well to mandate that these and only these three fees may be charged by
card issuers, and to require standardization of key cardholder agreement
terms, just as is currently done with insurance policies. Card issuers would
be free to compete and price as they wish within this focused structure.
Consumer Debt Hearing, supra note 19, at 21 (statement of Adam J. Levitin,
Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center).
" See Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts:
Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 452 (1991).
" See 15 U.S.C. § 1639(2)(B) ("The Board, by regulation or order, shall prohibit
acts or practices in connection with . .. refinancing of mortgage loans that the Board
finds to be associated with abusive lending practices, or that are otherwise not in the
interest of the borrower.").

2011]

THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE TO PROTECT CONSUMERS

1125

the financial crisis. In doing so, the Fed characterized its power
as "broad[,] both in absolute terms and relative to HOEPA's
statutory prohibitions." 10 0 Yet, while the Fed launched into a
lengthy discourse on the definitions of unfair and deceptive
practices, relying mostly on the FTC's policy statements, it
remained silent as to the precise definition of its power to target
abusive practices.10 1 Instead, the Fed proceeded to repeatedly
invoke the term to characterize several practices.
Although the Fed declined to define abusive, it did identify
several practices that were not abusive. The Fed sharply
rejected any notion that abusive practices were those that were
simply unaffordable to consumers.o 2 Of especial relevance to the
CFPB was the Fed's suggestion that better disclosure by itself
could not stop abusive practices. 103
The Fed hesitantly declared only two practices as abusive:
loan flipping and equity stripping.1 04 Loan flipping involves
repeated mortgage loan refinancing within a short time period
with no benefit to the borrower. o As each refinancing generates
additional fees and more principal owed at higher rates, the

.ooTruth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 1672, 1679 (Jan. 9, 2008).
101See id. ("HOEPA does not set forth a standard for what is unfair or deceptive,
but the Conference Report for HOEPA indicates that, in determining whether a
practice in connection with mortgage loans is unfair or deceptive, the Board should
look to the standards employed for interpreting state unfair and deceptive trade
practices acts and the Federal Trade Commission Act, Section 5(a),
15 U.S.C. 45(a).").
102 See id. at 1675, 1677 (Repeatedly mentioning "abusive and unaffordable
loans") (emphasis added). Congress appears to agree that unaffordable or excessive
loans, without more, are not abusive; this is reflected in Congress's decision to
prohibit the CFPB from imposing a usury limit. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1027(o), 124 Stat. 1376, 2003
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5517(o) (Supp. IV 2011)) ("No provision of this [title] shall be
construed as conferring authority on the Bureau to establish a usury limit applicable
to an extension of credit offered or made by a covered person to a consumer, unless
explicitly authorized by law.").
103See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 1672, 1676 (Jan. 9, 2008) ("[It appears
unlikely that better disclosures, alone, will address adequately the risk of abusive or
unaffordable loans in the subprime market."). But see id. at 1703 ("The Board
believes that disclosure of a dollar figure for each fee will discourage abusive
servicing practices by enhancing the consumer's understanding of servicing
charges.").
14 See id. at 1686.
'os Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law
and Economics of PredatoryLending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1263 (2002).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

1126

[Vol. 85:1105

borrower's equity in his home is "stripped.""o' The Fed's findings
suggest that two threads run through both practices: consumer
action is induced by a potential benefit that is supposed to run to
the consumer, and the action taken causes either no benefit or a
detriment to the consumer.o 7 Such a definition was far too
restrictive to carry out the Fed's mandate to address abusive
practices. If anything, it serves as an example of a narrow
definition that the CFPB should avoid.
Congress's dissatisfaction with the Fed's hobbled
interpretation of its powers to crack down on abusive practices
compels a broader reading of the term. The conference report
accompanying Dodd-Frank stated in unmistakably pointed
language: "[T]he Federal Reserve Board failed to meet its
responsibilities under HOEPA, despite persistent calls for
action."10 The Conference Report continued:
In spite of the rampant abuses in the subprime market and all
the damage imposed on consumers by predatory lendingbillions of dollars in lost wealth-the Board has never
implemented a single discretionary rule under HOEPA outside
of the high cost context. To put it bluntly, the Board has simply
not done its job. 09

1n See Legislative Solutions for Preventing Loan Modification and Foreclosure
Rescue Fraud:HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Hous. & Cmty. Opportunity of the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 25 (2009) (statement of Robert E. Story,
Chairman-Elect, Mortgage Bankers Association); Engel & McCoy, supra note 105;
Vincent DiLorenzo, Mortgage Market Deregulation and Moral Hazard: Equity
Stripping Under Sanction of Law 66-67 (St. John's Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Paper No 09-0179, 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1488293. HOEPA itself contains provisions that
address equity stripping, however the mortgage crisis proved that those provisions
alone were ineffective. See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) ("A
mortgage referred to in this subsection means a consumer credit transaction that is
secured by the consumer's principal dwelling, other than a residential mortgage
transaction . . ."); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1) (2009); Consumer Protections in
Financial Services: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban
Affairs, 111th Cong. 60 (2009) (statement of Patricia A. McCoy, George J. and Helen
M. England Professor of Law, Univ. of Conn. Law Sch.) ("After 1994, it increasingly
became evident that HOEPA was incapable of halting equity stripping and other
sorts of subprime abuses.").
107 See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 1672, 1674-75 (Jan. 9, 2008).
10 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 15 (2010).
'"

Id. at 27 n.77.
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Congress's enactment of a flexible definition of abusive,
coupled with Congress's clear dissatisfaction with the Fed's
narrow interpretation of its powers to reach abusive practices
suggests that the CFPB should adopt a broad, expansive
interpretation of its powers to address abusive practices.
III. A NEW HOPE: THE THEORETICAL REACH OF SECTION 1031

As a command to an agency, Section 1031's ultimate reach
will be a matter for the courts to decide.110 The CFPB will be free
to interpret Section 1031 subject only to its understanding of
Congress's intent, and the courts will decide whether those
interpretations are entitled to Chevron deference.111 Under
Chevron, courts first ask whether Congress has spoken to the
issue in question." 2 If Congress's intent is clear, the agency must
defer to Congress's unambiguously expressed intent."3 If the
statute is silent or ambiguous, then the court will uphold the
agency's regulation so long as it is based on a reasonable,
permissible, rational construction of the statute." 4
Despite Chevron deference, statutory interpretation is a dark
art."' The starting point for all statutory construction is the
language of the statute itself."' Because the Restatement-like
Section 1031 is inherently ambiguous, the plain text itself is

See Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
n1 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84243 (1984).
112 See id.
113 See id.
110

n1 See id.
11 See Easterbrook, supra note 84, at 550 ("Good statutory construction requires
the rarest of skills. The judge must find clues in the structure of the statute, hints in
the legislative history, and combine these with mastery of history, command of
psychology, and sensitivity to nuance to divine how deceased legislators would have
answered unasked questions."); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-Inthe
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983) ("I suggest that
the task for the judge called upon to interpret a statute is best described as one of
imaginative reconstruction, The judge should try to think his way as best he can into
the minds of the enacting legislators and imagine how they would have wanted the
statute applied to the case at bar.").
116 See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) ("The
task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of [the statute] begins where all such
inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself. . . . [I]t is also where the
inquiry should end, for where . . . the statute's language is plain, the sole function of
the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.") (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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unlikely to be dispositive." 7 Courts often deputize dictionaries in
service of interpretation; however, these too are unlikely to be
helpful.1 18 Black's Law Dictionary defines abusive as something
"characterized by wrongful or improper use."' 19 The Oxford
English Dictionary is equally vague, defining abusive as
something "involving injustice or illegality." 12 0 Departing from
the text of the statute, courts employ a range of interpretive
tools, including the canons of interpretation and legislative
history, to wring meaning out of ambiguous statutes. Using
those tools, this Note will next consider potential interpretations
and applications that might earn Chevron deference as
reasonable, permissible, and rational constructions of Section
1031.
A.

UnilateralCredit Card Rate Increases

Congress shined the legislative spotlight on several of the
most pernicious credit card practices with the Credit CARD Act
of 2009,121 an Act that serves as a natural starting point to
identify abusive practices the CFPB can address. Working
within the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") framework, the Credit
CARD Act continued to emphasize disclosure as an effective
consumer remedy.'2 2 The Act requires the Fed to post copies of
all credit card contracts on the Internet so that consumers can
ostensibly compare the terms and conditions attached to different

"' See supra Part II.B. Like the American Law Institute's Restatements of Law,
Section 1031 speaks in broad strokes, invoking inherently ambiguous phrases that
require refining interpretations to unlock their full meaning and reach.
n.See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225-28 (1994); cf
FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) ("In the absence of [a statutory] definition,
we construe a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning.").
n- See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 4 (9th ed. 2009) (defining abusive as related to
people as "habitually cruel, malicious, or violent").
120 See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
46 (2d ed. 1971) (defining abusive
alternatively as "extremely offensive and insulting," and "engaging in or
characterized by habitual violence and cruelty").
121 See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
122 See generally id.
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cards.123 The Act also requires enhanced disclosure of fees,
penalties, and the consequences of paying only the minimum

amounts due. 124
Consumer advocates broadly agree that one of the most
dangerous features of credit card contracts-indeed, the feature
that makes credit card contracts unlike virtually any other
contract-is the credit card issuer's ability to unilaterally change,
at any time, for any reason, the interest rate applied to
completed purchases. 1 25 The Credit CARD Act chipped away at
the credit card issuer's ability to unilaterally change contract
terms, codifying proposed rules that would have required at least
forty-five-day written notice before creditors could raise interest
rates.126

While the Credit CARD Act purports to prevent creditors
from unilaterally raising rates, it provides a large exception that
is likely to render such protections meaningless. Under the Act,
creditors are allowed to unilaterally raise rates if a consumer
fails to make at least the minimum payment for sixty days.'2 7
With such an uncomfortably high unemployment rate,128 it is not
123 See id. § 204, 123 Stat. at 1746 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1632(d)
(2006 & Supp.
IV 2011)).
12 See id. §§ 201-203, 123 Stat. at 1743-46 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1637.
125 See Modernizing Consumer Protection in the Financial Regulatory System:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 111th
Cong. 60 (2009) [hereinafter Modernizing Consumer Protection Hearing] (statement
of Adam J. Levitin, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center);
Frontline: Secret History of the Credit Card (David Rummel & Nelli Kheyfets,
producers) (PBS television broadcast Nov. 23, 2004), transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/creditletclscript.html. Then-professor
Elizabeth Warren explained,
I don't know any merchant in America who can change the price after
you've bought the item, except a credit card company. . . . The real question
here is whether or not you can change the price, not for new items you buy
after your credit score has changed, but for old credit that you've already
taken out. My mortgage company agreed to an interest rate, and if I lost
my job, my mortgage company does not get to double my mortgage. Credit
card companies can say, "Remember how you bought the big-screen TV at
9.8 percent interest? We've decided we want 29.9 percent interest." And
there's not a darn thing you could do about it right now.
Id.
126 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(c)(2) (2010); § 101, 123 Stat.
at 1735-36.
127 See § 171, 123 Stat. at 1736-37; 15 U.S.C. § 1666i-1(b)(4).
128 See, e.g., Employment Status of the Civilian Noninstitutional
Population,
1941 to Date, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat0l.htm
(last modified Mar. 1, 2012) (reporting a 2010 unemployment rate of 9.6%).
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unreasonable to expect troubled consumers to increasingly miss
their payments.12 9 Those who do, the most vulnerable among us,
will be left unprotected by the Act and subject to unilateral rate
increases.
Existing consumer protection doctrines cannot reach
unilateral rate increases. A finding of unfairness is potentially
foreclosed on two grounds. First, although raising rates on
unsuspecting consumers certainly causes substantial injury,
Congress's embrace of a net societal benefits standard requires
that the injury not be outweighed by any countervailing or
13
Despite loud objections from
competitive benefit to industry.s
consumer advocates, credit card companies have consistently
asserted that risk-based pricing remains critical to their business
success.13 ' Thus, the CFPB may be unable to argue that the
harm caused by unilateral rate increases outweighs the benefits.
Second, there is an established public policy supporting the
freedom to contract.' 3 2 As a result, it is unlikely that the CFPB
could declare that unilateral rate increases are unfair.
Deception doctrine is equally unhelpful.133 Rather than
misrepresent or omit material information, credit card companies
reserve in unambiguous and certain terms the right to
unilaterally raise rates. Thanks to the Credit CARD Act, those
reservations now hide in plain sight on the government's own
servers.
Consumers have found that unconscionability doctrine is
especially unsuited to fight unilateral rate increases. As an
initial matter, as a defense to a contract, the single-litigant
structure of unconscionability litigation makes it a less-than1" See Frontline: The Card Game (Lowell Bergman & Oriana Zill de Granados,
producers) (PBS television broadcast Nov. 24, 2009), transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/creditcards/etc/script.htnl. Explaining how
the exception nearly swallows the rule, Martin Eakes, Chief Executive Officer of the
Center for Responsible Lending, stated, "So here we are in a period of unprecedented
unemployment, and everyone who loses their job is going to become 60 days late on
their credit card bill. What sense does it make to let someone, when they're down,
get stomped on by increasing their credit card interest rate from 9 percent to 29
percent?" Id.
130 See FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness,supra note 38.
125, at 53
131 See Modernizing Consumer Protection Hearing, supra note
(statement of Adam J. Levitin, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University
Law Center).
112 See infra Part III.B.1.
...See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006) (depriving the FTC of the ability to regulate banks).
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ideal vehicle to protect consumers at large, especially from a
practice where the harm is so particularized.134 While as part of
a contract of adhesion, it would not be especially difficult to
establish procedural unconscionability, courts have rejected
attempts to find unilateral rate increases substantively
One court bluntly stated: "[t]he practice
unconscionable.
of retroactively increasing the interest rate is not
unconscionable."' 5
Unilateral rate increases, however, likely implicate three of
Section 1031's four independent bases for declaring a practice
abusive.136 First, under Section 1031(d)(1), the practice likely
materially interferes with a consumer's ability to understand the
terms and conditions affecting his use of credit. As defined by
the FTC, materiality encompasses "information that is important
to consumers and, hence, likely to affect their choice of, or
Even the Fed itself warns
conduct regarding, a product."3
consumers: "One of the most important things to understand
about your credit card is its interest rate."138 By reserving the
right to unilaterally change rates at any time, creditors make it
impossible for consumers to know what interest rate will attach
to a given transaction. Thus, unilateral rate increases are both
material and interfere with a consumer's ability to understand
the terms and conditions attached to his credit card. Further, a
finding of abusiveness would vindicate the policy considerations

134 See Oren Bar-Grill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 75-77 (2008).
"' Augustine v. FIA Card Servs., 485 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (E.D. Cal. 2007)
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). But see McCoy v. Chase
Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., 559 F.3d 963, 970-71 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted 130
S. Ct. 3451 (2010); Evans v. Chase Bank USA, No. C-05-3968 SC., 2006 WL 213740,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2006) ("Plaintiffs' unconscionability contention may have
had some weight.").
136 The practice would even likely fall under the House's rejected definition of
"abusive." See supra Part II.B. By reserving the right to unilaterally raise rates,
preventing consumers from knowing what interest rate might apply to a purchase,
creditors deprive consumers of the ability to protect their own interest in using a
financial product. When taken in the aggregate, the practice is reasonably likely to
contribute to instability and greater risk to the financial system as consumers are
plunged further into debt.
13 Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984).
1
Credit Card Interest Rates, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/creditcard/rates.html (last updated June 15, 2010).
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underlying this prong by acknowledging that disclosure is
unlikely to adequately address as complex a financial concept as
a unilateral rate increase.
Second, under Section 1031(d)(2)(A), even if consumers
understood the nature of the contractual condition provision to
which they were agreeing, the reserved prerogative to raise rates
still takes unreasonable advantage of the consumer's inability to
understand the card's risks and costs. In fact, the creditors'
contract regime makes it impossible for consumers to ever
understand the true cost of using the card since the price of a
transaction can never be known with certainty until it is paid off
in full.
Finally, unilaterally changing rates implicates Section
1031(d)(2)(B) by taking unreasonable advantage of a consumer's
inability to protect his interests in using the credit card. Even if
a responsible consumer researched the cost of his purchase and
paid his bill on time in accordance with the contract month after
month, his creditor would still retain the power to retroactively
and unilaterally raise the cost of his purchase.13 9 As a result, the
CFPB could likely prohibit unilateral rate increases as an
abusive practice under Section 1031.
B. Abusive DraftingPractices

Amorphous Fine Print Credit Card Contracts
Credit card contracts are notorious for their long, fine print,
a function and privilege of America's strong notion of the freedom
to contract. Forming a contract requires only a bargain, mutual
assent, and consideration.14 0 Credit card issuers are generally
able to avail themselves of this contractual freedom subject only
to a handful of limitations. 14 1
1.

Paying bills in full is the only way for consumers to avoid interest rates.
Fifty-eight percent of families carry a balance and do not pay off their credit cards in
full. See BRIAN K. BUCKS ET AL., RECENT CHANGES IN U.S. FAMILY FINANCES:
139

EVIDENCE FROM THE 2001 AND 2004 SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCES 31 (2006);
accord CONSUMER PAYMENT CHOICE SURVEY, supra note 15, at 42 (reporting that

56.3% of consumers carried a balance).
140

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

141 See,

§

17 (1981).

e.g., Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.) (restricting certain terms, conditions, and practices that creditors may
employ in credit card contracts).
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Despite being widely regarded as ineffective, the current
regulatory regime emphasizes disclosure as the best way to
protect consumers from harmful contract provisions. 142 Although
disclosures are important, both the contract reader and the
contract writer conspire to render them ineffective. Although
most Americans read at or below the eighth-grade level, most
credit card companies write their contracts at or above the tenthgrade level. 143 Even if consumers had the basic proficiency to
understand the content of credit card contracts, credit issuers
routinely eschew best practices in favor of confusing fonts,
The
misleading organization, and ineffective headings. 144
average credit card contract spans 3,771 words, while some of the
wordiest agreements take more than 20,000 words to explain
their terms. 145 As a result, studies show that consumers
routinely ignore credit card contracts, including governmentmandated disclosures. 4 6
Clearly, disclosure by itself is
insufficient to protect consumers.

142 See Consumer Debt Hearings, supra note 19, at 20 (statement of Adam J.
Levitin, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center)
("Disclosure has been the primary paradigm for card regulation since the 1968
Truth-in-Lending Act. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that it works for complex
financial products like credit cards.. . . The sheer number of explicit prices [sic]
points that make it difficult for consumers to accurately and easily gauge the total
cost of using credit cards.").
143 See GAO CREDIT CARD REPORT, supra note 17.

...See id.

" See Connie Prater, U.S. Credit Card Agreements Unreadable to 4 out of 5
Adults, CREDITCARDS.COM (July 22, 2010), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-cardnews/credit-card-agreement-readability-1282.php.
146 See Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
730 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1127
(N.D.Cal. 2010) ("customers would not and could not be expected to read the lengthy
document"); Jeff Sovern, Preventing Future Economic Crises Through Consumer
Protection Law or How the Truth in Lending Act Failed the Subprime Borrowers, 71
OHIO ST. L.J. 761, 794 ("[Elven under perfect conditions, when no one is attempting
to distract consumers from focusing on disclosures, deceive them, or rush them into
a particular transaction, disclosures may not be useful to consumers when they
create cognitive dissonance.") (discussing MACRO INT'L INC., DESIGN AND TESTING OF
EFFECTIVE TRUTH IN LENDING DISCLOSURES 6, 11 (2007)) ("When shown a sample

cardholder agreement, few of the participants said they would read the entire
document if they received it. Others said that they would skim it and look for what
they felt were the most important headings. In each group about half of participants
said that they would not look at the cardholder agreement at all. . . . Most
participants indicated that the reasons they do not read their agreements are that
the type size is very small and they find them difficult to understand."); see also Alan
M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 233, 233 (2002) ("Most consumers do not read contracts or disclosure forms.").
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The credit card industry defends the length and complexity
of their contracts as a function of judicial and regulatory action,
rather than a conscious abuse of the freedom to contract.14 7
Blaming "the nature of contract law," one of the industry's top
lobbyists has asserted that the reason consumers cannot
understand credit card contracts is that "required state and
federal disclosures" coupled with "lawsuits . . . have compelled

[us] to use certain terms, certain words, and to include certain
information."148 The practice of writing long, fine print credit
card contracts is likely to implicate two of the CFPB's
independent bases for declaring a practice abusive under Section
1031. First, by making contracts difficult to read, credit card
companies likely violate Section 1031(d)(1) by materially
interfering with a consumer's ability to understand both the
terms and conditions of his credit card. Consumers who overpay
147 Despite the industry's assertions, working with
a group that included,
among others, a professor of banking law and a former counsel to Citibank, branding
expert Alan Siegel designed a one-page credit card contract that Americans with an
eighth-grade education could understand. See Press Release, Siegel+Gale,
Siegel+Gale Introduces a Simple, One-Page Credit Card Agreement that
Anyone Can Understand (June 3, 2009), available at http://www.siegelgale.com/
pdflSiegel+GaleIntroduces-a SimpleOne-PageCredit%2OCard%20Agreement%
20That%20Anyone%2OCan%2OUnderstand.pdf. The model contract is a poignant
example of how disclosure, when presented properly, can be effective. The CFPB,
drawing on its in-house research office to refine the content and design, would be
well advised to promulgate a similar model contract. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1013(b)(1), 124 Stat.
1376, 1968 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(1) (Supp. IV 2011)). Any such contract
would be entitled to safe harbor status under Dodd-Frank, and would seem to be
exactly what Congress had in mind when enacting the provision. See id. § 1032, 124
Stat. at 2006-07 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5532); S. REP. No. 111-176, at 172 (2010)
("[T]he Bureau is granted rulemaking authority to ensure that information relevant
to the purchase of such products or services is disclosed to the consumer in plain
language in a manner that permits consumers to understand the costs, benefits, and
risks associated with the product or service. In prescribing rules, the Bureau is
required to consider available evidence about consumer awareness, understanding
of, and responses to disclosures or communications about the risks, costs, and
benefits of consumer financial products or services. The Bureau is granted the
authority to provide a model form of such disclosure standards, and a safe harbor is
provided for covered persons that use model forms included with a rule issued under
this section.").
148 See
Your Bottom Line: Credit Card Contracts May Change Due
to New
Legislation (CNN
broadcast
Nov.
21,
2009),
transcript
available at http://archives.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0911/21/ybl.01.html; Jessica
Yellin, A Push To Simplify Credit Card 'Gobbledygook', CNN (Nov. 20, 2009, 10:27
PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/11/19/credit.card.contracts/
(quoting
American Bankers Association senior vice president Nessa Feddis).
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because of an inability to understand their credit contracts may
switch banks.14 9 Thus, sticking with the FTC's definition of
materiality,150 the practice of writing long, fine print contracts is
material to those consumers. Further, eschewing best practices
and writing contracts that the average American cannot
understand interferes with a consumer's ability to understand
the terms and conditions of his credit cards. A finding of
abusiveness under this prong would also acknowledge the reality
that the disclosure-based regime underpinning the Credit CARD
Act is simply insufficient by itself to protect consumers from
contracting abuses.
Second, by obfuscating key terms and conditions, credit card
companies take unreasonable advantage of a consumer's ability
to protect his interest in choosing which credit card to use,
potentially violating of Section 1031(d)(2)(B). As with unilateral
rate increases, if consumers cannot understand the very terms
attached to their cards, how can they choose among competing
cards in the first place? As a result, the CFPB can likely declare
that the practice of writing long, fine print contracts is abusive.
Real World Examples of Abusive Creditor Practices
Beyond merely writing long, fine print contracts, companies
have conducted market research to determine how best to
dissuade consumers from reading their contracts. For example,
in Ting v. AT&T,1"' AT&T's market research determined that the
vast majority of consumers would stop reading a special mailing
informing them of major changes to their contracts if it was
prefaced with the statement: "[P]lease be assured that your
AT&T service or billing will not change under the AT&T
Customer Services Agreement; there's nothing you need to do."5 2
2.

14 See Brian Grow & Robert Berner, About that New, "Friendly" Consumer
Contract, BUSINESSWEEK, (Apr. 30, 2009, 5:00 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/
magazine/content/09_19/b4130048127451.htm ("Innovative lenders and other
companies are trying to. . . attract new customers by eliminating tricky fees and
payment terms."); cf SUMIT AGARWAL ET AL., Do CONSUMERS CHOOSE THE RIGHT
CREDIT CONTRACTS? 12-13 (Dec. 2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=843826.
150 See supra note 138 and accompanying
text.
a 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003).
152 Id. at 1133-34 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
AT&T's market research indicated that only twenty-five percent of customers would
open the notice if it was sent as a separate mailing, ten percent would not even look
at it, and only thirty percent would read the entire contract. Id. at 1134.
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The practice has analogues in credit card agreements. In
addition to its standard contract, Bank of America provides an
additional sheet labeled "Important Summary of Changes to
Your Account." 5 3 Consumers who read the summary but not the
agreement would miss a default provision that lets Bank of
America impose a penalty APR that is ten percent higher than
the standard APR.154 While the Ninth Circuit of the United
States Court of Appeals struck down the worrisome contracts in
Ting on unconscionability grounds, the CFPB could likely
address a range of similar practices under Section 1031, rather
than strike at the application of an individual contract, as
unconscionability requires. *
Conducting market research to dissuade consumers from
reading contracts likely implicates at least two bases for finding
a practice abusive under Section 1031. First, both AT&T's
market research and Bank of America's practice of sneaking
material information into a separate notice likely implicate
Section 1031(d)(1)'s ban on materially interfering with a
consumer's ability to understand the terms or conditions
attached to a service. The market research employed in Ting
interfere with a consumer's
was used specifically to
understanding of the conditions associated with AT&T's service.
Similarly, by needlessly making important disclosures difficult to
find, Bank of America interfered with consumers' ability to
process the universe of information needed to responsibly use
their credit cards. Because both companies knew that consumers
would be less likely to read material information, rendering their
disclosures ineffective, the CFPB could likely declare the practice
abusive.
Second, it is difficult to imagine a practice more thoroughly
tailored to Section 1031(d)(2)(A)'s prohibition on taking
unreasonable advantage of a consumer's lack of understanding of
the material risks or costs of a service. By choosing a method of
communicating for the express purpose of denying consumers the
information they need to responsibly use a service, both
companies took unreasonable advantage of their customers'
153 See Ronald J. Mann, "Contracting"for Credit, 104 MICH. L. REV. 899, 908
(2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
154 See id.
"I See infra Part III.C. As discussed above, unconscionability doctrine is unable
to serve as a basis for broader consumer protection measures. See supra Part I.C.
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ability to understand the risks and costs of their services. Thus,
the CFPB could declare that it is an abusive practice within the
meaning of Section 1031 to research which disclosures consumers
will not read, and then choose them precisely because of that
quality.
Not all such research, however, would need to be declared
abusive per se. The CFPB could issue a nuanced rule that
accounts for how companies use the results of such research. The
CFPB could choose to make corporations carry the burden of
proving that their market research was used, for example, to
increase consumer attention. If, however, research was used to
increase only their bottom line to the detriment of their
consumers, then the CFPB could choose to act on a case-by-case
basis.
C. ATM Overdraft Marketing
Overdraft protection ostensibly exists to protect consumers
who overdraw their checking accounts."' In 2008, more than
seventy-five percent of large banks automatically enrolled their
customers in overdraft protection that charged them up to $38
each time they overdrew their account."' Fifty-three percent of
banks, however, went further by writing abusive overdraft
policies that minimized consumer benefit while maximizing bank
profit.158

Abusive overdraft fees are tremendously lucrative for banks.
In 2008, banks collected nearly $40 billion from their customers
in service fees alone.'5 9 Of that, overdraft and not sufficient
funds ("NSF") fees constituted over $34 billion; overdraft fees by
themselves accounted for a staggering $27 billion in profit.'

156 See The Overdraft Protection Act of 2009: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 8 (2009) [hereinafter House Overdraft Hearings] (statement
of Nessa Feddis, Vice President and Senior Counsel, Center for Regulatory
Compliance, American Bankers Association).
...
See FED. DEPOSIT IINS. CORP., FDIC STUDY OF BANK OVERDRAFT PROGRAMS
6, 15 (2008) [hereinafter FDIC STUDY1. The median fee is $27, which, when charged
against a $60 withdrawal and repaid in two weeks, translates into an APR of
1,173%. See id.
15

See id. at 11.

159See LESLIE PARRISH, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, OVERDRAFT
EXPLOSION: BANK FEES FOR OVERDRAFTS INCREASE 35% IN Two YEARS 4 (2009).
160 See id. But see FDIC STUDY, supra note 157, at iv ("Banks operating
automated overdraft programs earned $1.77 billion in NSF fees in 2006 . . . .").
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Seventy-five percent of consumers do not incur overdraft fees.' 6 '
Instead, the entirety of the banks' profit comes from the twentyfive percent of consumers who spend upwards of $64 each year
paying NSF fees.162 The banks' most lucrative customers though,
are the five percent of consumers who spend an average of $1,610
each year paying NSF fees, often without receiving any
substantial benefit in return.163
1.

Overdraft Protection as an Abusive Product
As chronicled in Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,164

banks carefully craft abusive overdraft policies for the sole
purpose of boosting profit.'6 5 As one of seven class actions filed
against some of the largest banks in the United States, 16
Gutierrez alleged that Wells Fargo adopted three distinct anticonsumer practices.'6 ' First, instead of initially debiting smaller
charges to minimize overdrafts, the bank began charging the
highest amounts first. 68 This had the effect of quickly draining
the consumer's account to generate additional overdraft fees.'16
Second, the bank began comingling checks and ACH transactions
along with debit charges. 7 0 While debit charges themselves are
usually small, checks and ACH transactions are often used for

16
162

See FDIC STUDY, supra note 157, at iv.
See id.

163

See id.

16

730 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2010).

16 The court concisely described the allegations as follows:

[T]he essence of this case is that Wells Fargo has devised a bookkeeping
device to turn what would ordinarily be one overdraft into as many as ten
overdrafts, thereby dramatically multiplying the number of fees the bank
can extract from a single mistake. . . . These neat tricks generated colossal
sums per year in additional overdraft fees, just as the internal bank memos
had predicted. The bank went to considerable effort to hide these
manipulations while constructing a facade of phony disclosure.
Id. at 1082.
166 See In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., No. 09-MD-02036-JLK, MDL
2036, 2010 WL 3377592, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July 1, 2010).
167 These
practices were executed via changes to the bank's automated
processing systems. See Gutierrez, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 1095-96 ("Wells Fargo calls its
automated system HOGAN. The HOGAN deposit system does not exercise
individualized discretion based upon the nature of a customer's transactions....
HOGAN is designed to sequence and post transactions in a preprogrammed order
selected by the bank.").
'"
169
17o

See id. at 1083-84.
See id.

See id. at 1084.
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larger items like rent and mortgage payments." This further
drained accounts to generate additional overdraft fees.172
Finally, the bank extended what they termed a "shadow line" of
credit, which authorized debit transactions on overdrawn
accounts." 3 The consumer neither knew that their account was
overdrawn, nor how much credit the bank had extended to
them.7 4 These practices, the court ruled "did not benefit in any
way, shape, or form" the consumers they were ostensibly meant
to help.17 5
Wells Fargo's own market research, which the company
conveniently misplaced at trial, clearly demonstrated that the
bank's overdraft policies ran counter to consumer demand."7 At
trial, Wells Fargo parroted the typical lines industry lobbyists
invoke in support of abusive overdraft fees: that consumers
consider the largest charges like mortgage and rent payments to
be the most important, and thus, large charges should be cleared
first.'7 7 Yet, their internal market research explained: "paying in
serial order is the better choice.... When just these two were
offered, payment in order was preferred more strongly. This
approach has the advantage of being highly objective and easily
understood by the consumer."178 The study concluded "in bold
lettering that 'we feel that the best general policy is to pay them
171 See
12

id.

See id.

See id. at 1085.
id.; House Overdraft Hearings, supra note 156, at 2 (statement of Rep.
Maloney).
"' See Gutierrez, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 1090.
16 See Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C 07-05923 WHA, 2010 WL
4072240, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2010). Conducted in 1995 by Action Marketing
Research ("AMR"), the survey asked 450 individuals in the Twin Cities, Phoenix,
and South Dakota markets only one question: what Norwest should do if multiple
checks from a customer are presented at once without sufficient funds to cover all of
them. See id. at *3. Two-thirds of the way through the survey, blaming
"inconsistencies," AMR changed the question asked. See id. The numbers above
reflect the supposedly inconsistent data, which were consistent with the "tidal wave
of evidence," including "internal memos, effective cross-examination of bank
witnesses, and other documentary evidence" showing that "consumer preferences did
not motivate Wells Fargo's decision to post in high-to-low order." See id. at *2. Under
the revised question, sixty-two consumers, forty-one percent, split evenly as to
whether they would prefer charges to be deducted sequentially or by amount. See id.
at *4.
117 See Gutierrez, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 1105; House Overdraft Hearings,supra note
156, at 29.
1'

174 See

17

Gutierrez, 2010 WL 4072240, at *4.
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Characterizing the results as
in check serial number.' ""
"astounding," the court noted that "nowhere in the . . . study was

anything mentioned about 'the importance that consumers
placed on making sure their most important transactions did not
get rejected.' ""8o Clearly, neither consumer demand nor concern
drove the bank's decision to write abusive overdraft policies.
The CFPB could likely find that such overdraft policies are
abusive under two of Section 1031's independent bases for action.
First, under Section 1031(d)(1), abusive overdraft policies
materially interfere with a consumer's ability to understand the
conditions attached to overdraft coverage.18 1 The Gutierrez court
noted that had the plaintiff known of the abusive overdraft
policies, she would not have made the purchases that generated
the overdraft fees.182 Upon learning of the overdraft charges
plaguing her account, another class plaintiff chose to close her
Thus, abusive overdraft policies are
account altogether. 18 3
material since they affect a consumer's choice of, or conduct
regarding, financial transactions. The overdraft policies also
interfered with the plaintiffs' ability to understand the terms and
conditions of their account because they could not have known
which transactions would have generated overdraft fees. The
CFPB could thus declare that such policies materially interfere
with consumers' ability to understand the conditions attached to
their checking accounts.
Second, the CFPB could almost certainly declare
under Section 1031(d)(2)(A) that Wells Fargo's efforts take
unreasonable advantage of a consumer's lack of understanding of
the material risks, costs, and conditions of overdraft protection.
In Gutierrez, Wells Fargo argued that each plaintiff was
responsible for tracking her checking account balances by
using a check register.184 "Even if [Plaintiff] had meticulously
maintained a chronological check register of all of her
transactions," the Gutierrez court replied, "it could not have
accurately reflected or predicted how the bank would have posted
179

Id. at *6.

so Id. at *3-4.

s8 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
See Gutierrez, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 1090.
18. See id. at 1095.
1
See id. at 1129. ("Registers necessarily rely upon a chronological accounting
of transactions and reinforce a natural expectation by a customer that transactions
will subtract chronologically.").
182
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transactions."8 5 By thwarting a consumer's ability to predict the
balance of his account, Wells Fargo's overdraft policies take
unreasonable advantage of a consumer's lack of understanding of
the costs of overdraft protection and could thus be declared
abusive.
Abusive Marketing Campaigns
The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs has expressly declared that as deployed by banks,
overdraft protection itself constitutes an "abusive practice[] ."'
In 2005, the Fed agreed that such overdraft policies were
"abusive and misleading.""' At Congress's urging, the Fed
2.

issued rules in November 200918 curbing the most egregious

overdraft practices, most importantly by requiring consumers to
opt-in to continue receiving overdraft protection. 189
The Fed's opt-in requirement led to flurry of questionable
marketing efforts from banks encouraging consumers to sign up
for overdraft protection. The efforts uniformly characterized
overdraft protection as a necessary lifesaver, something without
which consumers would be set lost and adrift in a choppy and
hostile marketplace. Banks also tested several messages to
determine which would be most effective. One of the more
innocuous messages from Chase encouraged consumers to
"[wlatch your mailbox so you can say 'Yes' to continue Chase
debit card overdraft coverage." 9 o A more aggressive mailing
warned:
Even though most deposits are not immediately available to
approve debit card transactions, we may have authorized a
debit card transaction when you did not have sufficient
available funds.
SOON YOU WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DO THIS
ANYMORE-UNLESS WE HEAR FROM YOU.
When a deposit is not available (so you don't have enough
money to make a purchase or even pay for an unexpected
18'
186

Id. at 1091.

See S. REP. No. 111-176, at 19 (2010).
s' See id.; Electronic Fund Transfers, 71 Fed. Reg. 1638 (Jan. 10, 2006).
188 See Electronic Fund Transfers, 74 Fed. Reg. 59033, 59052 (Nov.
17, 2009).
189 See 12 C.F.R. § 205.17(b) (2010).
190 Andrew Martin & Ron Lieber, Banks Apply Pressure To Keep Fees Rolling In,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/23/your-money/creditand-debit-cards/23fee.html.
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emergency like a highway tow) Chase Debit Card Overdraft
Coveragesm may allow your debit card transactions to be
authorized at our discretion. 91
Yet another mailing from Chase, featuring a prominent
starburst graphic promising "YOU DECIDE," posed a question to
consumers: "Is Chase Debit Card Overdraft Coverage. . . right

Our bankers can help you make an informed
for you?
decision."192 Along those lines, Chase reportedly stationed bank
employees near ATMs to promote overdraft protection.193
The intent of these efforts is evidenced by the promotional
materials marketing firms developed to help banks convince
consumers to opt-in to overdraft protection. "Millions of dollars
"The clock is ticking ... you
are at stake," one firm warned."
get
stubborn overdraft users to
will
you
so
how
that
...
know
9
opt-in?" s Another firm developed what it called the "Opt-In
Total Solution Planning Guide," encouraging banks to implement
a multi-step process to boost retention. The guide urged banks to
identify consumers prone to overdrafts who could be targeted
with "specific communication and education strategies to
maximize the opt-in rate ... and retain your income. "196
The banks' advertisements likely fall within the CFPB's
power to address abusive practices. As an initial matter the Fed,
empowered by HOEPA, chose to characterize certain types of
advertisements not as deceptive, but as abusive.'9 7 By suggesting

191Pitching Overdraft Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, http://documents.nytimes.com/
pitching-overdraft-coverage#document/pl (last visited Jan. 28, 2012).
192 Ben Popken, Banks Luring You into Signing Back up for High Overdraft
Fees, THE CONSUMERIST (June 18, 2010, 4:38 PM), http://consumerist.com/2010/06/
banks-trying-to-get-you-to-sign-up-for-high-overdraft-fees.html.
.9.Laura Northrup, Chase Now Has Human ATM Greeter Who Helpfully
Sells Overdraft Protection, THE CONSUMERIST (July 14, 2010, 8:00 AM), http://
consumerist.com/2010/07/chase-installs-atm-greeter-who-sells-debit-card-overdraftprotection.html.
14 Geoff Williams, Why
Your Bank Wants You To Sign up for Overdraft
Protection, DAILYFINANCE (Aug. 18, 2010, 3:00 PM), http://www.walletpop.com/
blog/2010/08/18/why-your-bank-wants-you-to-sign-up-for-overdraft-protection.
" Id. (alteration in original).
'9 PINNACLE FIN. STRATEGIES, PINNACLE OPT-IN TOTAL SOLUTIONsm: REG E
AMENDMENT PHASE I: PLANNING GUIDE 26 (2010), http://documents.nytimes.
com/pitching-overdraft-coverage#document/p5.
1" See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 1672, 1714 (Jan. 9, 2008) ("Prohibiting
the use of comparisons in advertisements that are based solely on low introductory
'teaser' rates or payments should address abusive practices in advertisements
focused on debt consolidation.") (emphasis added).
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that "our bankers can help you make an informed decision,"
Chase exposed itself to Section 1031(d)(2)(C)'s prohibition on
taking unreasonable advantage of a consumer's reasonable
reliance on the bank to act in his interests. Standards for
identifying conduct that might constitute taking unreasonable
advantage of a consumer's reliance on his bank may be inferred
from the Treasury Department's Joint Guidance on Overdraft
Protection Programs. 9 8 The document urges banks to adopt
several best practices in discussing overdraft protection with
their customers. Included among the recommendations are:
(1) clearly explaining the discretionary nature of overdraft
protection; (2) fairly representing alternatives; (3) clearly
disclosing overdraft fees, and; (4) illustrating when multiple fees
Drawing on its mandate to protect
might be charged.' 9
consumers, the CFPB could declare that failing to follow these
best practices constitutes taking an unreasonable advantage of a
consumer's reliance on the bank to act in the consumer's
interests. It is unlikely that in honoring their promise to help
consumers make "an informed decision," Chase's bankers
explained the discretionary nature of overdraft fees, the cost of
the fees involved, or how and when consumers might incur
multiple fees. Accordingly, the CFPB could likely declare that
such advertisements and practices are abusive.
The CFPB could alternatively reach Chase's and Wells
Fargo's marketing efforts by drawing on its powers to address
The banks' advertisements fit within
deceptive practices.
Congress's original conception of deception doctrine as "subtle
misleading advertisements" made by those seeking to gain an
economic advantage by defrauding or misleading consumers.oo
Because Congress left deception undefined in Section 1031,201 the
CFPB could, if it so wished, honor Congress's original intent and
define deception to "cover every form of advertisement deception

19s

70 Fed. Reg. 9127, 9131-32 (Feb. 24. 2005).

199
200

See id.

See supra notes 50, 55 and accompanying text.
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 1031, 124 Stat. 1376, 2005 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (Supp. IV
2011)); supra Part II.A.
201

1144

ST JOHNSLAWfREVIEW

[Vol. 85:1105

over which it would be humanly practicable to exercise
governmental control."20 2 This prerogative, however, lies with
the CFPB, and the remainder of this Section will analyze the
CFPB's powers to reach the bank's practices using the FTC's
existing conception of deception doctrine. As mentioned, the
existing doctrine requires a finding of: (1) a material
(2) representation or omission that is (3) likely to mislead the
consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances.20 3
The Gutierrez court itself spoke of Wells Fargo's "misleading
marketing materials," characterizing the bank's customers as
"deceived" under California's UDAP statute.20 4 As discussed,
Wells Fargo's representations were material under the FTC's
understanding of the term.2 05 Wells Fargo also made relevant
representation and omissions regarding its overdraft protection.
The court noted that Wells Fargo's marketing materials,
including its new customer "Welcome Jacket," stated that
deductions from a customer's checking account would happen
"immediately" or "automatically."206 The bank failed to mention
that it had actually instituted a practice of deducting the highest
charges first.2 07 Finally, Wells Fargo's representations and
omissions were likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably
under the circumstances. A reasonable consumer, epitomized by
the class plaintiff in Gutierrez, would believe that his charges
were being deducted sequentially. A reasonable consumer would
further believe that if he followed the bank's advice and tracked
his transactions in a register, it would reflect the actual balance
in his account. Thus, even if it were to interpret Section 1031 to
mirror existing doctrine, the CFPB could likely declare that
Wells Fargo's advertisements were deceptive.
CONCLUSION

In recent years, with devastating consequences, the
consumer financial credit industry has managed to evade and
undermine Congress's consumer protection laws. Armed with
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
204 See Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank, 730 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1091 (N.D. Cal.
2010).
20 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
206 See Gutierrez, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 1128 (internal quotation marks omitted).
207See id. at 1129.
202
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the expansive power to address abusive practices, the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau potentially represents the rising of a
new dawn in consumer protection. Interpreted appropriately,
Section 1031 stands as a remarkable grant of power to the new
Bureau, one that may help finally realize Congress's
longstanding goal of providing consumers with the safe and
reliable marketplace they deserve.
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